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Miracles play a vital role in world religions. The fascination and expectations exerted by 
miraculous events, as well as the heated debates on their authenticity are well-known. However, 
miracles have never been uniformly or univocally defined, either to defend or to reject their 
credibility. Their ambiguity and openness in theology and philosophy is rooted in the very 
ambiguity and openness of the lexicon of the different sacred scriptures. Furthermore, in religious 
discourse miracles are sometimes referred to in the context of scriptural narratives, sometimes in 
extra-scriptural ones. In order to reconstruct the meaning of “miracle” we can begin with a survey 
of “miracles” as they are narrated in the sacred scriptures and then move on to theological and 
philosophical debates.  
 
Miracles in the Old Testament are usually performed by or through Prophets, in order to confirm 
their power and affect the course of history. The most well-known miracles are connected to Moses 
and the Exodus: e.g., Moses’ staff (or his brother Aaron’s) turns into a snake (Exod. 4:3), the waters 
of the Red Sea are divided (Exod. 14:21), manna feeds the Hebrews in the desert (Exod. 16:12). In 
Biblical Hebrew there is no single word for “miracle,” but different terms: (1) oth, “sign” (e.g.: 
Exod. 7:3; Dt. 4:34; 6:22; 7:19, 34:11); (2) mophet, “portent” (e.g.: Ps. 71:7); (3) niphlaot, 
“wonders” (e.g.: Ps 107:24); (4) geburah, “act of power” (e.g: Dt. 3:24); (5) nes, “signal” 
(occurring only once: Num. 26:10 yet later largely employed in the Talmudic literature). In the 
New Testament wonders are worked and signs are given mostly by Jesus but also by his apostles 
and later followers, for instance Paul. Different terms occur in the New Testament as well: (1) 
dynamis, “power,” or “mighty work” (e.g.: Mt. 11:20 ff.; Mk. 6:2); (2) ergon, “work” (e.g.: Jn. 
9:3); (3) semeion, “sign” (e.g.: Jn. 2:11; 4:54); (4) teras, “portent,” “prodigy” (combined with the 
preceding in the expression semeia kai terata, e.g.: Acts 2:43); (5) thaumasia, “wonders” (e.g Mt. 
21:15); (6) paradoxa, “paradoxical events” (e.g.: Lk. 5:26). 
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When Greeks and Romans used expressions equivalent to the modern "laws of nature" these were 
related to moral principles and therefore had nothing to do with any discussion of miracles. (Grant 
1952: 19 ff.). However, the classical world developed a debate on the unlikelihood of the 
extraordinary facts reported by mythological and poetic discourse and miracles were perceived as 
a challenge to credibility even before connecting them with the concept of natural laws and the 
debate thereupon. We can here briefly recall Tertullian (c. 160-220) and Origen (c. 185-283) who 
chose different strategies for dealing with the interpretation of miracles. The former denied the 
value of philosophy and took miracles literally; the latter preferred an allegorical interpretation 
(Grant 1952: 193 ff.). Augustine (c. 354-430) represented a turn. He experienced the social 
relevance of miracles, which in his times began to be attributed to contemporary figures of saints 
and therefore to play an important role in leading pagans to conversion. He elaborated an articulated 
definition of miracle, seen as an extraordinary fact, which apparently surpasses the hope or the 
capacity of the beholder, and goes against the known course of nature (Bron 1979(2): 14). However, 
the current official doctrine of the Catholic Church is mainly based on Thomas Aquinas’ (1225-
1274) Summa contra gentiles (3.99.9 ff.). Aquinas defines a miracle as an event that stretches 
beyond the natural power of any created thing to produce and something of which only God could 
be the principal cause; he develops a refined classification of miraculous events as well: miracles 
supra, contra, praeter naturam (see Bron 1979(2): 15-16; Swinburne 1989: 19-22).  
 
The concept of miracle is nowadays still central in Catholic doctrine, especially as related to the 
praxis of canonization, whereas Protestant theology from its very beginning has denied the miracles 
of the saints and emphasized the scriptural ones (Monden 1960: 295 ff.). The idea of the miraculous 
has challenged important contemporary theologians, in that the supernatural aspect is difficult to 
conceptualize or accept. Amongst the most important contemporary interpretations, we can briefly 
recall that of R. Bultmann (1884-1976) who advocated a “demythologization” of the biblical 
narratives, a demand allegedly dictated by scientific development (Bultmann 1984). Similarly, P. 
Tillich (1886-1965) tried to drive attention away from the supernatural aspect towards that of the 
religious significance, assumed to be the defining trait of miracles (Tillich 1951: 115-118). 
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Miracles can be said to have concerned almost every major personality of modern Western 
philosophy, even if their respective positions did not always develop into articulated, autonomous 
theories. Original perspectives can be found for instance in B. Spinoza (1632-1677), Th. Hobbes 
(1588-1679), J. Locke (1632-1704), G. W. von Leibniz (1646-1716) and I. Kant (1724-1804).1 
Whereas such positions nowadays tend to be discussed against the background of the respective 
philosophies, as part of historical criticism of those very philosophers, the most important and still 
vital contribution within modern philosophy is that of D. Hume (1711-1776) and is to be found in 
the tenth chapter of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). The core of Hume’s 
interpretation of miracles is represented by the following passage: 
 
“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience 
has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is 
as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. [...] No testimony is 
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood 
would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish” (quoted in 
Swinburne 1989: 27-28) 
 
Hume did not focus on the religious significance of specific biblical miracles; rather, he discussed 
some miracles that had allegedly occurred in a Jansenist community and elaborated such 
interpretation along the lines of his theory of knowledge. He interpreted the concept along that of 
“law of nature” and implicitly outlined a method for the evaluation of the credibility of miracles 
(that in fact does not seem to leave much room for belief in them). All this set the agenda for the 
contemporary analytical debate. 
 
Miracles are discussed within contemporary analytical philosophy to a considerable extent, 
sometimes under the appearance of a mere commentary to Hume (see for instance Fogelin 2003). 
Some philosophers have even specialized in miracles and dedicated to them extensive works, 
discussing preceding positions and developing original views. Such is the case of R. Swinburne 
(Swinburne 1970; Swinburne 1989) and A. H. Larmer (Larmer 1985; Larmer 1988; Larmer 2003; 
                                                          
1 For historical surveys and systematic discussions of single contributions see Bron 1979(2), Burns 1981, Brown 
1984. See also Corner, D. 2007; Corner M. 2005; Twelftree 2011. 
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Larmer 2004). The former defines a miracle as “an event of extraordinary kind, brought about by 
a god, and of religious significance” (Swinburne 1970: 1). According to the latter, a miracle is 
rather “an unusual and religiously significant event beyond the power of nature to produce and 
caused by an agent which transcends nature” (Larmer 1988: 14).  Both specify at length, in 
analytical style, the various elements of their definitions, and eventually defend them from 
respective adversaries (Overall 1985; Overall 2003). 
 
The Muslim debate displays a similar variety of meanings and positions. Let us begin once again 
with a survey of scriptural miracles. The Qur’an itself as the descent of a revelation conforming to 
a heavenly archetype is “the” miracle of Islam, with its amazing uniqueness and inimitability being 
ultimate proof of its divine origin. This meaning is nevertheless not the only one. Firstly, Qur’anic 
passages have been interpreted as relating to deeds or episodes of the Prophet whose character 
might be judged, by modern standards, supernatural or miraculous; for instance, when a spider 
conceals the Prophet and his fellow Abu Bakr by weaving its net at the entrance of a cavern where 
they have taken refuge (Q 9:40); the Prophet’s instantaneous journey to Jerusalem overnight (Q 
17:1); the splitting of the Moon (Q 54:1); and when two angels open the young Prophet’s breast, 
take out the heart, purify it with snow, then replace it (Q 94:1).2 Secondly, the Qur’an refers to the 
supernatural deeds concerning Prophets that we encounter in the Old Testament as well: for 
instance when Abraham cannot speak after being told of his wife’s pregnancy at an old age (Q 
3:41); when Moses performs his prodigies in front of the Pharaoh and the Hebrews (Q 7:106–108, 
133; Q 20:80); when Solomon commands the winds (Q 21:81; Q 34:12; Q 38:36). Thirdly, such 
deeds and episodes are often defined with the term aya (pl. ayat) “sign.” The attribute related to 
aya, bayyina, or “clear,” becomes itself a synonym of “sign” within Qur’anic lexicon, and such 
terms are also used with reference to what we could define as two different classes of phenomena. 
The first class is constituted of natural processes and their creation; e.g. fruit ripening (Q 6:99); the 
growth of plants (Q 13:4); rain (Q 16:65); brewing (Q 16:67); the alternation of night and day 
(27:86). The second class is that of historical or past events:  for instance, when God sends a sacred 
                                                          
2 This is in fact only one possible interpretation of the verse at stake, and one generally not accepted by Shia, since 
the Prophet is considered sinless from birth.  Analogous considerations hold for other narratives touched upon here, 
such as the opening of the Prophet’s breast or the night journey to Jerusalem. However, they seem worth mentioning 
in a reconstruction that, rather than focusing on specific theological doctrines, tries to provide the reader with an 
overview of Qur’anic passages or of narratives connected to such passages, that might be prima facie judged by any 
reader, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, as supernatural. 
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she-camel to the people of Thamud (Q 7:73; Q 11:64; Q 17:59; Q 26:154–158) or when a violent 
wind is raised against the Adites (Q 41:15–16). In addition, the very term aya describes the verses 
themselves of the Qur’an (Q 26:2; Q 27:1; Q 31:2). Furthermore, we find in the Qur’an reference 
to deeds and episodes that display supernatural character without being directly described as aya; 
for example when slain birds are resurrected for Abraham (Q 2:260) or when Abraham is protected 
from fire (Q 21:69). It should be noted that the Qur’an also explicitly suggests de-emphasizing the 
importance of miracles and extraordinary events.3 Other miraculous narratives flourished around 
the ascetic figures known as Sufi. The corpus of the tales relating their wondrous deeds constitutes 
an extremely rich literature (see Schimmel 1975: 284–302; Gramlich 1987; Woodward 2001: 206–
230).  
 
Muslim theologians reacted to Qur’anic and extra-Qur’anic narratives by developing extremely 
fine-grained definitions and classifications of miracles. In particular, a further terminological and 
conceptual distinction was made between mujizat, miracles of the prophets, meant to confirm 
God’s power rather than the prophets’ powers (thus similar to the Greek dynameis) and karamat 
(similar to the Greek charisma), basically denoting the favored condition conceded by God to the 
saints, which implies the capacity of performing supernatural deeds as well, sometimes kept secret 
by the saint (see Gramlich 1987: 1618; Schimmel 1994: 187; Geoffroy 2000; Radtke 2000).   
 
In Islamic philosophy, the problem of the extraordinary was particularly connected with that of 
causation; its discussion was suggested by the Greek philosophical texts preserved, transmitted and 
interpreted by Arabic scholars. For instance, Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) defended the idea that 
miracles, meant as divinely operated interruptions in the usual course of nature which prove the 
truthfulness of a prophet, are logically possible along with a literal reading of miracle stories in the 
                                                          
3 Q 6:7–10: “(7) If we had sent unto thee a written message on parchment, so that they could touch it with their 
hands, the unbelievers would have been sure to say ‘This is nothing but obvious magic!’ (8) They say, ‘Why is not 
an angel sent down to him?’ If We did send down an angel, the matter would be settled at once, and no respite would 
be granted them. (9) If We had made it an angel, We should have sent him as a man, and We should certainly have 
caused them confusion in a matter which they have already covered with confusion. (10) Mocked were many 
apostles before thee; but their scoffers were hemmed in by the thing they mocked.” Remarkably, also Jesus in the 
Gospel refused to perform miracles on demand (see Mt. 12:38–40: 38. “Then some of the Pharisees and teachers of 
the law said to him, ‘Teacher, we want to see a sign from you.’ 39 He answered, ‘A wicked and adulterous 
generation asks for a sign! But none will be given it except the sign of the prophet Jonah. 40 For as Jonah was three 
days and three nights in the belly of a huge fish, so the Son of Man will be three days and three nights in the heart of 
the earth.’” NIV). 
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Qur’an. Averroes (or Ibn-Rushd, 1126–1198) rather defended the centrality of the miracle of the 
Qur’an and claimed that admitting a disruption of the order of nature is tantamount to denying the 
difference between certain and conjectural knowledge. However, he also admitted that miraculous 
stories had edifying value.4 
 
Clearly, there is neither a single word for “miracle,” nor a clearly specific feature of all scriptural 
narratives that are or can be defined as “miraculous,” nor any univocal definition in philosophy and 
theology, this being valid for all Abrahamic religions and their respective theologico-philosophical 
traditions. However, miracles can be assumed in a broad sense as a guiding thread for the 
exploration of a specific debate. We can namely explore how “miracles,” both meant as specific 
philosophical characterizations and events narrated in religious texts that can be intuitively thought 
of as miraculous, are characterized by specific authors. We can, in other words, let the specific 
meanings of “miracle” emerge from the respective authors’ usage of that very term, including 
reference to specific passages of the sacred scriptures and to other authors’ conceptualization and 
discussions. This is the methodological stance adopted here while focusing on some Muslim 
authors who, in different ways, hold that natural science and Islamic beliefs do not contradict each 
other.  
 
The first author we focus upon is Sir Seyyed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), the Indian reformer who 
developed a renewed theology for Islam that comprised a strong appreciation of science and 
technology. He wrote, inter alia, a long commentary to the Qur’an and a rendition of the Prophet’s 
life. Curiously (and perhaps not very consistently) he seemed to deny the presence of any 
supernatural elements in the Qur’an, and buttressed his rejection of supranaturalism as follows: the 
laws of nature are like promises of God, therefore advocating their interruption is tantamount to 
advocating God’s unfairness.5 Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan gives us from the very Preface and 
Introduction a definition of nature: 
 
 
                                                          
4 Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Introduction to the Second Part and Seventeenth Discussion (al-
Ghazali 2000: 161–178) and Averroes, The Incoherence of the Incoherence, 509–515 (Averroè [Averroes] 2006: 
471–477). For comparative analyses see Kogan 1981 and Yazicioglu 2011. 
5 For a reconstruction and criticism of such discussion see Ahmed 2003/2004. 
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“Again, what is Nature? It is law, in conformity to which all objects around us, whether 
material or immaterial, receive their existence, and which determines the relation which 
they bear to each other. This law exists in the objects themselves. We say Nature (…) 
that is, God, that supreme and perfect Being upon whom the existence of all other 
beings originally depends (…)” (Khan 2008: 9).  
 
Throughout his treatise, that he conceived for “(...) the use of those Muhammedan youths who are 
pursuing their English studies (...)” (Khan 2008: 17) Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan takes great pains to 
present his version of the life of the Prophet in such a way that will be faithful to standards of 
rationality and science while at the same time saving the extraordinary character of the Prophet’s 
life itself. For example, as to the strange events which, according to several traditions, accompanied 
the birth of Muhammad such as the sudden drying up of the lake of Sala, he assures his readers 
that they are unreliable tales that “(...) evidently appear to have been borrowed from the poets, who 
make use of the figure synecdoche [sic]” (Khan 2008: 194). In another passage Sir Seyyed Ahmad 
Khan subscribes to the tradition according to which the Prophet was miraculously born 
circumcised, but he immediately specifies that, “This, however, is by no means to be considered a 
marvel, or miracle, being merely a lusus naturae” (Khan 2008: 200). Similarly, the episode of 
Muhammad’s night journey to Jerusalem is explained by Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan as a dream, 
something that, “(...) never occurred in the body, but was purely imaginary” (Khan 2008: 206; cf. 
also 329 ff). Furthermore, he rejects the explanation of the episodes of revelation as epileptic 
attacks (then popular among Christian critics of Islam); to his refusal of such a “pathologizing” 
explanation he adds nevertheless that there was nothing like a supernatural miracle involved, 
although  divine agency was (Khan 2008: 209-210).  Against those Christians who question the 
credibility of extraordinary tales concerning the Prophet, he objects in turn to the belief in such 
extraordinary events as Jesus’ multiplication of loaves and fishes (Khan 2008: 212-213).6 
 
An important interpretive trend, which had a precursor in the Egyptian Tantawi Jawhari (1862-
1940), author of the Jewels in the Interpretation of the Qur’an (26 vols., 1923-1935) is the so called 
“scientific exegesis of the Qur’an” or tafsir ilmiy (Wielandt 2002; Rippin 2005(3): 238-241; Dallal 
                                                          
6 Khan’s polemical target is mainly the Scottish author Sir William Muir, with his Life of Mahomet (1858-1861). See 
also Khan 2008: 337. 
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2010: 169-172). According to this line of exegesis, Qur’anic passages contain extremely accurate 
references to natural phenomena. The supposed accuracy of such descriptions is taken as proof of 
divine revelation: who could have known those phenomena in depth? Certainly not the Prophet, if 
even the most learned men of his time were unaware of them. This approach was given 
unprecedented visibility by a French surgeon and (supposed) convert, Maurice Bucaille (1920-
1998) with his 1976 book The Bible, the Koran, and Science.7 The “scientific interpretation” of the 
Qur’an, which already in the 1980s-90s inspired a flood of books and booklets is currently 
flourishing in the “new media.” There even exists a Committee of Scientific Notions in the Qur’an, 
a section of the Egyptian Ministry of Endowments, currently chaired by the Egyptian professor of 
geology, Zaghloul El-Naggar (b. 1933), a TV star of the “scientific interpretation” (Nkrumah 
2008). El-Naggar recommends approaching the Qur’an with philological accuracy and scientific 
competence (El-Naggar 2008: 17-23). However, when it comes to the episode of the splitting of 
the Moon mentioned in the opening of Sura 54, El-Naggar first advocates a strictly literal 
interpretation of its meaning: the verse refers to something that has actually happened, a miraculous 
and supernatural event beyond scientific comprehension. At the same time El-Naggar propagates 
the popular (pseudoscientific) narrative according to which NASA astronauts, in one of their 
explorations of the lunar surface, discovered the signs of the Moon’s fracture (El-Naggar 2010: 
69-73). The discourse on “scientific miracles” as El-Naggar develops it is therefore twofold: on 
the one hand “miracle” is defined with reference to the traditional concept of i‘jaz (the Qur’an’s 
inimitability) but its meaning is reformulated insofar as such inimitability coincides with the 
presence of notions unknown at the time of the Prophet; on the other hand, when it comes to 
supernatural proper, a strictly literal reading is prescribed by El-Naggar; in the case of the splitting 
of the Moon we even have an intersection of the two strategies since it is claimed that a 
(supposedly) scientific discovery confirms the fact that the supernatural event took place. 
 
An influential Qur’anic commentary was written, in a different time and a different cultural milieu, 
by the Turkish religious reformer “Bediüzzaman” (the “wonder of his time”) Said Nursi (1878-
1960). The Risale-i-Nur or Epistle of Light, consisting of fourteen books, was written by Nursi in 
order to explain the content of the Qur’an to large audiences. Nursi’s work is characterized by a 
                                                          
7 For a critical discussion of Bucaille’s ideas see Bigliardi 2011; for a biographical and intellectual profile of Bucaille 
see Bigliardi 2012a. 
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peculiarly convoluted and repetitive style. This is explained by various factors: Nursi was born in 
the village of Nurs, province of Bitlis, where Kurdish and Armenian were the languages of the 
local population and Turkish was the language of authorities and bureaucracy that he learnt after 
the age of twenty. Moreover, he was influenced by works which displayed an elliptic style, for 
instance by the mystic Ibn al-Arabi. Finally, the blending of religion, poetry, and mythology was 
common in his cultural milieu, which was still largely characterized by morality (Mardin 1989: 
36-37; 171; 176-177).8 Nursi faced the challenge of revivifying the Qur’an in a world that had just 
begun to be disenchanted (Mardin 1989: 37). A major challenge was posed by Ottoman positivism 
of the end of the 19th century, with its conception of nature as dominated by impersonal forces 
(Mardin 1989: 39). Moreover Nursi, who had traveled through Petersburg, Warsaw, Berlin, 
Vienna, and Switzerland (Mardin 1989: 89), knew and cherished the scientific-technological 
advancement of the “West,” and he urged Muslims to adopt it (Mardin 1989: 87).9 In his writings, 
he presents nature as a theophany, the display of God’s signs, therefore reversing a materialistic 
discourse that he found in the Turkish philosophical debates of his times (Mardin 1989: 93).  
 
When it comes to supernatural events, Nursi subscribes to the traditional doctrine according to 
which they were given to the Prophet, as well as to other prophets and saints, to corroborate their 
claims (Nursi 2006: 1-19; 25-30 and passim). However, Nursi adds to this another interesting 
doctrine. As T. Edis observes, Nursi 
 
 “(...) was not completely naïve about finding modern wonders in the Qur’an. He argued 
that the miracles in the Qur’an were described in obscure terms, to excite the curiosity 
of Muslims, to make it clear that wondrous feats were possible so that the believers 
would figure out how to realize these feats. In other words, Nursi combined the 
modernist tendency to naturalize scriptural miracle stories with the more traditional 
theme of locating all knowledge in the Qur’an” (Edis 2007: 92-93)10 
                                                          
8 The Risale-i-Nur is still very influential for the Nurculus movement that emerged in Western Turkey in the 1920s. I 
will not pursue here the political aspects of Nursi’s thought and influence. The commentary is not available in full in 
English, but single volumes are in circulation, such as Nursi 2006. 
9 Nursi was also aware of the importance of technology for religious proselytization; for instance, he compared the 
radio to a Qur’an reader with “a million tongues” (Mardin 1989: 38). 
10 Mardin states that, in Nursi’s “hybrid metaphors,” “technology is made to serve the ends of religion” (Mardin 
1989: 82). 
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It is to be remarked that wondrous, supernatural events were ascribed to Nursi himself in his 
lifetime, but he refused the role of miracle-maker (Mardin 1989: 75 and 188). 
 
We can now make a leap forward in time and linger on the doctrines of the Iranian-American 
scholar Seyyed Hossein Nasr (b. 1933). Nasr’s theories are expressed and defended in an 
impressive corpus, based on extensive philosophical knowledge of Muslim and Christian/Western 
sources alike, and incorporate Sufi mysticism. World religions, according to Nasr, are all ultimately 
based on a primordial doctrine of unity; each and every revelation that substantiated them 
functioned as a “vertical” link between human affairs and divinity. Each world religion 
encapsulates a teaching, whose core Nasr describes as scientia sacra, which reminds human beings 
of the transcendental unity of phenomena and of their divine source, which can be grasped by a 
human and at the same time divine faculty that Nasr calls Intellect. The main distinction and 
shortcoming of science as it has been practiced at first in post-Renaissance Europe and later 
worldwide is, according to Nasr, the missing appreciation of Intellect in favor of purely quantitative 
reasoning. Science has thus been “desacralized,” and knowledge has been highly 
compartmentalized. The implementation of desacralized science results, according to Nasr, among 
other things in contemporary ecological catastrophes. The solution, according to Nasr’s vision, can 
only be a return to the traditional scientia sacra.11 
 
An important historical stage in the gradual loss of awareness of the sacred, according to Nasr, was 
marked by Christian theological reflection; since Christian thinkers were trying to differentiate 
themselves from Greek rampant naturalistic doctrines and they “…drew an excessively tight 
boundary between the supernatural and the natural, leading to an impoverished view of nature…” 
(Nasr 1981: 35). Due to such separation, together with the constant emphasis on Christ’s 
miraculous birth and life, according to Nasr, “…the evidence of religion seemed to many a 
European mind to rely upon the miracle which breaks the regularity of the laws observed in nature, 
whereas the regularity itself is no less evidence of …the Wisdom of God reflected in His creation” 
(Nasr 1981: 193).  
                                                          
11 For a general reconstruction of Nasr’s views see Stenberg 1996, Chapter 2 as well as the so far unparalleled 
monograph on Traditionalism: Sedgwick 2004. 
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Through Qur’anic concepts, according to Nasr, we can properly see the cosmos as theophany; in 
this perspective, “… the fact that the sun does rise every morning is … as much cause for wonder 
as if it were to rise from the West tomorrow” (Nasr 1981:  195). Nasr emphasizes namely the fact 
that in the Qur’an, the same term, ayat or “signs” which is used for supernatural phenomena, refers 
as well to natural ones and to the verses of the Qur’an itself (Nasr 1981: 192). “The Qur’an”, in 
Nasr’s words, “addresses not only men and women but the whole of the cosmos … [and] does not 
draw a clear line of demarcation between the natural and the supernatural, nor between the world 
of man and that of nature” (Nasr 1993: 130). Once scientia sacra is restored, religion and science 
can be said to be fully in harmony.  
 
Furthermore, Nasr links the erroneous emphasis on the miraculous to another misled and 
misleading theoretical presupposition that he identifies in modern science and labels 
“uniformitarianism”; it means “…belief in the uniformity of ‘laws of nature’ over long periods of 
time and expanses of space.” According to Nasr, such extrapolation is just another expression (and 
cause) of the ignorance of “multiple levels of existence” (Nasr 1981: 209). Miracles, in fact, point 
at the existence of other levels: namely, they “… mark an eruption of the Eternal order in the 
temporal…”; “In the occurrence of miracles,” Nasr observes, “not only are the ordinary laws of 
physical existence penetrated by laws belonging to higher orders of reality, but the ordinary rapport 
between time and Eternity is drastically changed” (Nasr 1993: 34). Once uniformitarianism is 
abandoned, according to Nasr, one can understand how “in days of old” one can have walked on 
water and such a narrative is not perceived anymore as something that can be “explained away” 
(Nasr 1993: 161). 
 
The contemporary debate on Islam and science has witnessed the emergence of Muslim scientists 
who are especially engaged in the religion-science dialogue and, notwithstanding different ideas 
and nuances regarding the interpretation of specific matters, share some substantial traits. Among 
those common traits relevant for the present essay I shall list their competence in contemporary 
physics, their rejection of the “scientific interpretation” of the Qur’an, their theistic outlook, their 
full acceptance of science (even including Darwinian evolution) as methodologically independent, 
and the openness to other monotheistic religious traditions, considered by them equally able to 
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establish an harmonious relationship with natural sciences. Such authors include the Iranian M. 
Golshani (b. 1939), the Iraqi M. B. Altaie (b. 1952), the French B. Guiderdoni (b. 1958), and the 
Algerian N. Guessoum (b. 1960).12 
 
Golshani is open towards the existence of miracles nowadays; he interprets them by drawing on an 
argumentation elaborated by the Iranian cleric and thinker M. Motahhari (1920-1979), and along 
a line of thought that is not extraneous to analytical philosophy of science: miracles are events 
obeying laws of nature of which the witnesses of those very events are not aware. Such laws might 
cancel out the effect of known laws so as to give an impression of the suspension the known laws 
themselves; this is not a supernatural suspension, though, but a natural one according to unknown 
principles.13 Golshani is also open to a metaphorical interpretation of Qur’anic verses describing 
supernatural phenomena. Similar principles hold for Altaie, who invites us to be aware of how 
extraordinary the events described by quantum physics are: Moses’ staff turning into a snake might 
have been a perfectly natural if quantum event. The emphasis is put on the extraordinary rather 
than on the supernatural; however, Altaie does not exclude a metaphorical interpretation of such 
narratives either.14 Guiderdoni sketches a threefold classification of miracles: the miracle par 
excellence, according to the traditional doctrine, is the Qur’anic revelation; then miracles in a 
second sense can be extraordinary coincidences, fully explainable in physical terms; finally, 
miracles can be supernatural narratives, such as the splitting of the Moon. In this last case 
Guiderdoni is more inclined to embrace a spiritual, that is metaphorical, interpretation; he points 
out the amazing fact that the laws of nature are constantly at work but at the same time he does not 
rule out the possibility of the supernatural. One feature of miracles he is particularly eager to 
emphasize is their uniqueness, which renders them unverifiable.15 Guessoum also presents a 
nuanced interpretation. On the one hand he embraces Golshani’s theory, but he points out that in 
the case described by his Iranian colleague what we are talking about does not legitimately bear 
the label “supernatural” any more: the existence of unknown laws is indeed constantly accepted as 
a possibility in the scientists’ thought. On the other hand, Guessoum also invites us not to push 
                                                          
12 See their respective (partial) bibliographies as well as Bigliardi 2012b, Bigliardi 2014a, and Bigliardi 2014b. 
While reporting “personal communication” I refer to material acquired during one-on-one interviews later included 
in Bigliardi 2014b. 
13 Personal communication. See also Golshani 2003: 310-311. 
14 Personal communication. 
15 Personal communication. 
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Altaie’s analogy with quantum physics too far: Moses’ staff turning into a snake cannot be 
explained in quantum terms. “Supernatural” meant as the suspension of the laws of nature is 
rejected by Guessoum: in this sense, he cannot accept the literal reading of the splitting of the 
Moon since it would entail phenomena that would not even be explainable by appealing to 
unknown laws – they would simply be against the laws and in fact they did not leave detectable 
traces. Guessoum is rather inclined to save the expression “miracle,” or “miraculous” for 
extraordinary events, and, in a Muslim context, first and foremost for the Qur’an’s inexhaustible 
openness to new interpretations.16 
 
The Turkish scholar U. I. Yazicioglu (b. 1978) puts forth an interesting conceptual blend. She takes 
into account miracles as miraculous stories (considered as encapsulated in the Qur’anic text, not 
actually witnessed by the readers of the Qur’an), and points to two finely intertwined tensions. The 
first tension is between miracles considered as interruptions of the course of nature and the 
regularity of nature itself, a concept on which a consistent philosophy of science can be built. The 
second tension is between the presence of miraculous narratives in the Qur’an, up to an extent 
which cannot be easily dismissed, and the fact that the Qur’an itself de-emphasizes miracles (e.g. 
Q 6: 8-10). In order to harmonize all these aspects, Yazicioglu develops a theory that mainly relies 
on the doctrines of four thinkers: Al-Ghazali and Ibn-Rushd (Averroes), together with the 
contemporaries Nursi and Ch. S. Peirce (1839-1914). She begins by pointing out that Al-Ghazali 
seemingly held contradictory views, since on the one hand he defended the “logical possibility of 
miracles” and a “literal reading of miracles stories in the Qur’an,” while on the other hand he 
claimed that “miracles are almost useless for faith formation.” The seeming contradiction can be 
solved, Yazicioglu argues, if we take into account Al-Ghazali’s overall philosophy of nature, 
according to which “(…) the natural order is not a logical given, but a continuously re-enacted 
Divine gift.” In this sense miracles, rather than inviting us to disbelieve regularity, confirm it and 
unveil their divine origin (Yazicioglu 2011 § A). Yazicioglu points out as well that a seemingly 
puzzling tension can be detected in Ibn-Rushd, since he denied the existence of exceptions in the 
course of nature as destructive of knowledge, but also showed an appreciation of the edifying value 
of miracle stories for non-sophisticated believers, that he as a philosopher did not want to destroy 
(Yazicioglu 2011 § B). A superior synthesis of all these ideas is envisaged by Yazicioglu in 
                                                          
16 Personal communication. See also Guessoum 2011: 329-333. 
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Peirce’s pragmatic method, whose gist she summarizes as follows: “(…) if a concept has any 
meaning, it should be translatable into a certain attitude or action that can be experienced by us.” 
Yazicioglu emphasizes that Peirce himself recognized the spirit of his method in Jesus’ saying “Ye 
shall know them by their fruits” (Mt. 7:16). Consequently, miracle narratives according to her 
should be interpreted in the light of the question whether they “…suggest a general tendency or 
habit for the reader,” which she considers even more important than the possibility of documenting 
the historicity of miracles themselves. Yazicioglu specifically discusses the case of Jesus’ birth (Q 
19: 17 ff.). Is such a narrative meant to induce a change in our general attitude towards pregnancy? 
Not at all, Yazicioglu argues: they are meant instead to “...break…[the] inattentiveness to the very 
order [of nature] itself.” This first pragmatic aspect, following Yazicioglu, was precisely the 
“edifying value” of miraculous narratives that Ibn-Rushd appreciated and respected, and that can 
be better elucidated in Peircean terms. But there is another contribution of the past that can be 
similarly read in pragmatic key: Nursi identified in miraculous narratives a stimulus and an 
invitation to the readers to achieve the very same results through the means of technology: “Read 
from this perspective,” Yazicioglu argues, “the virgin birth can be taken as hinting at the horizons 
of reproductive technology…” (Yazicioglu 2009).   
 
As I have pointed out, a direct examination of the sacred scriptures seems not conducive to one 
univocal concept. There is no such thing as “the” Veterotestamentarian/ Neotestamentarian/ 
Qur’anic concept of miracle. “The” concept of miracle is not a definite description at all, and 
therefore there seems to be no such thing as the Christian/Muslim concept of miracle. What 
emerges in the first place after a recapitulation of “miracles” in the sacred scriptures and of different 
conceptualizations of “miracle,” is rather the fact that the discussion on a theoretical level originally 
depends on a specific conceptual selection of scriptural passages; and such selection seems to be 
only partly conscious as well as culturally determined.  
 
In other words, those authors who engage in the philosophical analysis of (what they perceive as) 
the concept of miracle in fact focus on a specific array of notions (for instance “exception to a law 
of nature”) within which the definition of miracles is formulated, and they accordingly try to assess 
the joint tenability of such concepts in the light of criteria of logical consistency. However, there 
appears to be a latent circularity at work that renders any attempt at “analyzing” miracles (i.e. 
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pinning them down to a certain definition) irreparably biased:  in fact, any definition is usually 
buttressed with specific narrative examples (scriptural or extra-scriptural) and those examples in 
turn are selected according to pre-existing (perhaps not completely conscious) assumptions on what 
is ordinary/extraordinary, natural/supernatural and so on. 
 
We can however ask whether there is a common feature to the different theories examined. I am 
inclined to identify it as the feeling of amazement with which miracles are associated together with 
their extraordinariness. Independently on whether they end up accepting or rejecting miracles, and 
on the specific, respective definitions, all the authors examined seem indeed to be converging on 
one point: a miracle, whatever it is, is something anomalous and hence amazing.17 What we 
observe if we follow the wanderings of miracles in the discourse on Islam and science, is in fact a 
constant negotiation over the boundaries of amazement, that are in their turn influenced by each 
author’s conception of science and of the prestige it exerts on their readership. Let us elaborate 
further on this point. 
 
Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan wants to stick to science as an absolute and therefore walks a tightrope 
in trying to explain all extraordinary Qur’anic events as exceptional but not as defying science: 
hence he uses for instance a category like that of lusus naturae in order to keep together, for the 
same event, extraordinariness/amazement and natural character. He wants, at the same time, to 
avoid all those explanations that, while being “scientific” in character, might discredit religious 
narratives such as reducing the very revelation to a series of episodes of epilepsy. The result is a 
somewhat elusive language game in which “scientific” references are mixed with the religious 
narrative itself (and the narratives he mentions as examples are accurately selected). Of course, a 
critic might say of him that he divests religious narratives of any supernatural trait, and that he 




                                                          
17 It should be noted that I am not making the concept of amazement coincide with that of miracle, and thus I am not 
slipping back into an essentialist, definite-description based explanation: amazement is indeed a feeling, whose 
causes are culturally and individually determined. For instance, I am not amazed anymore at sliding doors as I was 
some thirty years ago upon first seeing one as a child. Or consider this: it can be assumed that even a genius like 
Leonardo Da Vinci would have run away in panic if suddenly confronted with a plasma TV. 
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A similar, latent negotiation is at work in the “scientific interpretation” of the Qur’an. In the 
discourse on the tafsir ilmiy the emphasis shifts from the supernatural to the natural; however, the 
role of the scientific notions that are supposedly described with accuracy in the Qur’an is analogous 
to that of supernatural narratives. Both a supernatural event and the presence of a scientific notion 
in the revelation are indeed amazing and unexplainable if not referred to the work of the divinity, 
whose existence and power they confirm. One can philosophically, philologically and scientifically 
disagree with such a trend of course, however, on a cultural level, it should be agreed that it 
expresses a remarkable conceptual turn: two birds are killed with the same stone when the pre-
existing doctrine of the inimitability of the Qur’an hijacks the prestige of modern science, and 
perceived Western/foreign character of science is bypassed or neutralized. This might be explained 
in relation to the fact that the first authors who extensively embarked in this kind of exegesis 
worked and communicated in a colonial context, in which science was perceived as culturally 
foreign and as an instrument of oppression. Nursi, who although not in a colonial context was 
likewise amazed by Western science and technology, similarly tries to maintain the prestige of 
science (at least on a rhetorical level)  while treating miracles, but his discussion is enriched by a 
pragmatic or didactical nuance: miracles are not just a source of amazement, they are to be 
reproduced by the means of technology. 
 
In more recent times, El-Naggar, as we have seen, tries to keep together both the way of reasoning 
typical of the scientific interpretation of the Qur’an and the supernatural, when he appeals to 
staunch literalism, to the inexplicability of supernatural events in scientific terms, and to 
“scientific” confirmation. He thus expresses a sort of compartmentalization of thought (or, if we 
want to express this in even less benign terms, a double standard). His reader is invited to interpret 
the Qur’anic references to the natural world overemphasizing their supposed accuracy so to 
demonstrate the scripture’s harmony with science, while just accepting, at the same time, 
miraculous/supernatural narratives as reporting a real event and as not open to any metaphorical 
interpretation. This may represent a rather reassuring discourse for a readership that is looking for 
a way to consolidate or keep their faith in a modern world dominated by technology, while feeling 
that science and technology enjoy an original and superior connection to their religion and without 
questioning the supernatural.  
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The function of miracles in Nasr, who has his own strong ideas on how science should be 
(re)shaped, is deeply different from those we have analyzed so far, but likewise dependent on his 
specific conception of science. On the one hand Nasr invites his readers not to over-emphasize the 
role of miracles; on the other hand, he assumes the existence of supernatural events as proof that 
the laws of physics as they are formulated within “de-sacralized” science are not what physics itself 
really is, or should be, all about. Miracles in his case are still associated with amazement, but they 
are used against science (in the meaning of the term that Nasr criticizes). Therefore, the way Nasr 
uses miracles is somewhat the reverse of the one we have seen (latently) at work in Sir Seyyed 
Ahmad Khan: it is critical and non-conformist vis-à-vis science. In other words, it does not get 
absorbed by scientific concepts, but is rather used to unhinge them. One might of course disagree 
with Nasr, but undoubtedly his treatment of the concept of miracle proves consistent with his 
idiosyncratic treatment of science. 
 
Analogously the four physicists whose theories we have shortly recapitulated hold interpretations 
of miracles that display a similar dependence on their conception of science. Rather than try to 
seduce a semi-educated (and/or scientifically illiterate) audience, the four natural scientists aim at 
a public that is scientifically and philosophically well informed. Moreover, they are willing to set 
up a dialogue with academics engaged in similar scientific and philosophical enterprises within 
other religious traditions, especially within the other two religions of the Book. Golshani 
formulates a definition of miracles that keeps together science and the exceptionality of religious 
events without impairing the credibility of religion vis-à-vis science. Altaie adopts a similar line 
when he invites us to understand that what physics describes is no less extraordinary than 
supernatural events (and that perhaps the latter can, as far as certain episodes are concerned, be 
explained through the laws governing the former). Guiderdoni elaborates an all-encompassing 
classification of miracles, with some emphasis on the natural and the spiritual meaning of miracle; 
he does indeed absorb the rich variety of interpretations emerged within Muslim debates, rooted in 
the polysemy of the term aya, and at the same time he sidesteps staunch literalism. Guessoum 
strongly rejects the concept of supernatural as well as the idea of “scientific miracle” and associates 
the feeling of amazement once again with the formal and semantic traits of the Qur’an.18 
                                                          
18 I suggest that the Algerian physicist embarks in an exegetical enterprise that runs risks analogous to those faced by 
Sir Seyyed Ahmad Khan: someone might indeed embrace his criticism of the “scientific miraculousness” of the 
Qur’an and still hold against him that he renders the Qur’an “all too human,” with an emphasis on a kind of 
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Finally, I. Yacizoglu’s philosophical theory represents a sophisticated synthesis in which modern 
science, classical Muslim authorities and a contemporary Western philosopher all converge in a 
conceptualization of miracles that keeps the pragmatic aspect of the concept in the footprints of 
Nursi; at the same time Nursi’s very position, that might sound too unsophisticated to a 
contemporary reader, is updated through the appeal to Peirce’s concepts, and the supernatural is 
not completely ruled out. In sum, Yacizoglu’s approach results in appealing to a highly educated, 
philosophically informed, and intercultural audience. 
 
My conclusion is also to suggest a line of investigation capable of being applied to other theological 
and philosophical contributions, Muslim and Christian alike. The discussion of “miracles” seems 
to act as a prism that deconstrues ideas on science and its power and appeal, as held by specific 
authors, to an extent perhaps unclear to the authors themselves. It can help us to explore the 
boundaries between science, philosophy, and theology, as well as the definition of science as 
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